Should remaining stocks of smallpox be destroyed?

We have been given the following question as an assignment to look into and research the debate surrounding the remaining stocks of live smallpox (variola) virus, and whether or not the remaining stocks should be destroyed or retained for further research.

One of the longest and most contentious international policy debates has swirled around the question of whether to destroy the last known stocks of the smallpox (variola) virus, which are preserved at two World Health organisation (WHO)-authorised repositories in Russian and the United States. Although smallpox was eradicated from nature more than three decades ago, concerns surfaced in the early 1990s that a few countries might have retained undeclared samples of the virus for biological warfare purposes. Because a smallpox outbreak would be a global public health emergency of major proportions, in 1999 the WHO approved a research program at the two authorised repositories to develop improved medical defences against the disease.

Since the eradication of smallpox in 1977, there has been great debate between leading scientists as to whether or not the remaining stocks of the live smallpox (variola) virus should be destroyed. The remaining stocks of smallpox virus are being held at two World Health Organization (WHO) repositories in Russia and the United States (US). Some scientists fear that the destruction of the remaining live virus will result in the world being left vulnerable to threats from terrorists who may have unrecorded stocks of the live virus to use a bioweapon against us. Hammond and Ching (2011) believe that since the eradication of smallpox was over three decades ago, there is no real reason to retain stocks of the virus as it is no longer needed for research as vaccinations and anti-viral drugs for the treatment of smallpox have already been established and are plentiful.  In order to present an argument for this, I have researched and studied the article journal; smallpox virus stocks at the 64th WHA: implementing the conclusions of the major review. By Edward Hammond and Lim Li Chung (2011). This assignment will focus on the reasons for the destruction of the remaining stocks and look into whether or not there is a real threat from terrorists, and whether there is any real reason to continue to store and carry out research on the remaining live stocks of smallpox.

 

Hammond, E. and Ching, L. (2011) Smallpox virus at the 64th WHA: Implementing the conclusions of the major review. Switzerland: Third World Network.